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Abstract
This paper analyzes decisions of multi-product firms regarding product selection, innova-
tion and advertising as choices of consumer valuation distributions. We show that a profit-
maximizing monopolist chooses these distributions so as to maximize the dispersion of the
valuation differences between goods across consumers. By contrast, she chooses the willingness-
to-pay to be maximally or minimally dispersed, depending on the set of available distributions.
In our benchmark model with uniform valuation differences, prices are increasing in valuation
difference heterogeneity, but in more general settings this is not necessarily true. Moreover, the
relation between willingness-to-pay heterogeneity and prices may well be non-monotone. Over
wide parameter ranges, the firm’s choice of valuation distribution does not maximize net con-
sumer surplus. This problem is exacerbated when the firm has access to strategies that distort
valuation heterogeneity or willingness-to-pay heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
Multi-product firms are omnipresent. It is therefore hardly surprising that, from the early contribu-
tions of Ramsey (1929) to the recent work of Amir et al. (2016), Armstrong and Vickers (2018) and
Nocke and Schutz (2018), a large literature has dealt with the pricing decisions of such firms. By
contrast, their non-price decisions have received less attention. The analysis of topics such as prod-
uct selection, innovation and advertising has mostly been carried out in models of single-product
firms. This paper therefore proposes a theoretical approach to the non-price decisions of multi-
product monopolists. It starts from the observation that such decisions can be usefully regarded
as choices of valuation distributions subject to constraints. First, consider product selection. We
think of a firm as having distributional knowledge of preferences for products that might be brought
to the market. By selecting products from an existing set of alternatives, by improving existing
products or creating novel products, the firm influences the distribution of product valuations that
it offers to consumers. Second, on a related note, though advertising typically does not influence
the consumers’ true valuations for a firm’s products, it may have an impact on perceived valuations.
Thus, we can think of advertisers as selecting distributions of perceived valuations, with constraints
given by the nature of the true valuation distribution.
We will deal with two related, but different types of questions. Taking the perspective of a profit-
maximizing firm, we ask how it should optimally choose valuation distributions when it faces
constraints that reflect technological conditions (in the case of product selection and innovation)
or credibility restrictions (in the case of advertising). Taking the consumer perspective, we ask
how the firm’s choice of valuation distributions affects surplus, considering that it potentially also
influences pricing decisions. We address these questions in a setting where the firm sells two
imperfect substitutes. Its consumers buy one of the two products or none of them. The firm selects
the valuation distribution from some fixed set of alternatives as well as the price for the two goods.1
The firm has to take the average valuations across all consumers and goods as given; it can only
influence the shape of the valuation distribution.
In our benchmark model, the average valuations for the two goods and the valuation differences are
distributed uniformly and independently of each other, and the firm can choose the dispersion in
each of these dimensions. In this setting, we first analyze the effects of greater heterogeneity in the
differences between the valuations that consumers attach to its products. In the context of product
selection, this amounts to asking how the firm should differentiate its products from each other.
Should it focus on similar products, or should it sell very heterogeneous products? On the one hand,
some differentiation should be profitable to improve match quality for consumers. On the other
hand, the profitable extent of differentiation is limited by the heterogeneity of consumer preferences:
It is pointless to sell products that are highly differentiated when consumer tastes are not. Against
this background, our paper identifies a multi-product monopolist’s profit-maximizing strategy for
differentiating its products from each other. We find that the firm optimally chooses its products
1To focus on demand-side incentives, we abstract from different costs of the alternatives.
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so as to maximize the dispersion of the distribution of valuation differences. Intuitively, while
such increasing valuation difference heterogeneity will have ambiguous effects on the consumers’
valuations of individual goods, it will increase the highest valuation. This results in a positive
demand effect and thus in higher profits. By contrast, the effects on consumer surplus are mixed.
Even though consumers benefit from the resulting increase in their highest valuation, increasing
valuation difference heterogeneity induces higher prices. As a result, some consumers will lose. For
some parameter regions, even the average consumer surplus (net of prices) will fall.
Second, we analyze the effects of increasing heterogeneity of the average valuations that consumers
attach to a firm’s products, which we refer to as willingness-to-pay heterogeneity or WTP hetero-
geneity. In the context of product selection, we ask: Should a firm choose a product range that
appeals strongly to a small group of consumers, but much less to others, or should it act as a
generalist by providing a reasonable fit for most potential consumers? For instance, consider a
fashion firm that caters particularly to teenagers, but somewhat less to consumers in their twen-
ties. Should the firm attempt to focus even more on the teenagers’ tastes, even if it risks alienating
the less enthusiastic older consumers? Intuitively, when consumers have similar (and sufficiently
high) WTP, the monopolist will want to serve most or all of them. Consumers who are indifferent
between buying and not buying therefore have below-average valuations; therefore, a marginal in-
crease in heterogeneity reduces their valuations further, making them less likely to buy. This will
reduce demand and profits. As heterogeneity increases further, the consumers who are indifferent
between buying and not buying will ultimately have above-average WTP. Marginally increasing
heterogeneity will therefore increase their WTP and thus demand and profits. Related to these
observations, there are potential conflicts of interests between the firm and its consumers. While
profit maximization requires very high or very low heterogeneity, this is not necessarily true for
consumer surplus maximization.
While the profit effects of WTP-heterogeneity are similar to the single-product case (Johnson
and Myatt (2006)), the price effects are more involved, and they depend on the extent of valu-
ation difference heterogeneity. As long as valuation differences between the two goods are small
(and, in particular, in the degenerate case of a single product), prices are U-shaped in WTP het-
erogeneity.2 For higher valuation differences, prices can be N-shaped or increasing functions of
WTP-heterogeneity. Thus, the pricing behavior of multi-product firms differs significantly from
the behavior of single-product firms when valuation difference heterogeneity is large enough.
As mentioned above, our analysis not only applies to the choice of true valuation distributions (for
instance, through product selection), but also to the choice of perceived valuation distributions (by
advertising and, more generally by communication activities, e.g. by the way the firm presents
products to consumers). This links our paper to a literature in marketing and behavioral industrial
organization that has asked (usually in a competitive context) whether firms want to engage in
activities that confuse consumers about the true valuations for their products. For a large part of
the analysis, the distinction does not matter: Regardless of whether we think of the monopolist as
2When valuation differences are zero for all products, the analysis becomes equivalent to the single-product case.
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choosing perceived or actual valuation distributions, the profit-maximizing choice is the same, as
long as consumer behavior can be captured by the distribution. Our results on the optimal choice
of valuation distributions therefore apply immediately to this alternative interpretation. We can
use them to show that a monopolist will always want to exaggerate valuation differences between
the products she sells, whereas the incentives to exaggerate WTP-heterogeneity are less clear.
The welfare analysis for the choice of perceived valuation distributions, however, is entirely different
from the choice of true distributions. The potential for misalignment between consumers and firms
is substantial: Consumer confusion may lead to various inefficiencies, as consumers may buy when
they should rather choose the outside option (or vice versa), or they may end up buying the
wrong product. We will show how the welfare effects will depend on the monopolist’s available
communication strategies and, in particular, on whether she can merely exaggerate the consumers’
valuation differences between goods or the heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay across consumers or
whether she can even influence the ordinal ranking between goods.
We extend our analysis to a more general setting where the willingness-to-pay and the valuation
differences between the two products are not necessarily uniformly and independently distributed.
In this setting, the positive effects of increasing valuation difference heterogeneity on profits and
gross consumer surplus still hold, and we can find conditions under which the U-shaped relation
between WTP heterogeneity and profits survives. By contrast, without the uniformity assumption,
it is no longer clear that greater valuation difference heterogeneity increases prices. Intuitively,
though demand increases, so does the sensitivity of demand to prices. We show that, for suitable
valuation distributions, the latter effect can dominate, so that increasing valuation difference het-
erogeneity can reduce prices. Finally, we show how a simultaneous increase in the dispersion of
valuation differences and willingness-to-pay has a non-monotone (U-shaped) effect on prices and
profits, but a positive effect on consumer surplus.
The role of heterogeneity for a multi-product firm differs starkly from the case where each good is
sold by a single-product duopolist. We illustrate this issue for the standard case that both types
of heterogeneity are sufficiently small that the duopolists would cover the entire market. In this
case, valuation difference heterogeneity fully determines the duopoly outcome: As heterogeneity
decreases (the two products become more similar from the consumer perspective), the mass of
indifferent consumers increases and firms respond with more aggressive pricing, which reduces
their profits. By contrast, WTP heterogeneity has no effect as long as competition ensures full
coverage. This obviously differs from our analysis of the multi-product monopoly where, starting
from low initial heterogeneity, higher WTP-heterogeneity reduces profits.
Related Literature Johnson and Myatt (2006) analyze a single-product monopolist’s incentive
to engage in measures that increase the heterogeneity of the valuation distribution (”demand rota-
tions”). They find that the monopolist will go for extremes. She will either aim at making consumer
valuations very homogeneous, thus following a mass-market strategy and serving most or even all
of them, or she will try to make them very heterogeneous by following a niche strategy where it
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focuses on the consumers with very large willingness-to-pay. Our paper confirms this logic for the
multiproduct case, but it shows that the price effects are more complex. More importantly, it deals
with valuation difference heterogeneity, which has no counterpart in the single-product case.
Anderson and Bedre-Defolie (2019) consider a multiproduct monopolist’s incentive to provide dif-
ferent product varieties, and they compare the outcome to the social optimum. Contrary to our
paper, they focus on the number of products rather than the type.3 Another paper dealing with
the choice of different valuation distributions is Roesler and Szentes (2017).4 The authors ask how
consumers want to be perceived by profit-maximizing single-product monopolists. Supposing that
a consumer with a true valuation distribution receives an unbiased signal of his true valuation, they
determine the signal distribution that maximizes consumer surplus if the monopolist chooses her
optimal price. The structure of the problem constrains the choice to distributions that dominate
the true distribution in a second-order stochastic dominance sense. Apart from the focus on single-
product firms, the analysis differs from ours as the restrictions on the available distributions come
from the interpretations as signal distributions of the underlying true distribution.
Our analysis of consumer confusion is related to Hefti et al. (2020) who consider duopolists that
can confuse consumers by adding noise to their relative valuations. They identify properties of
the underlying distribution of true preferences determining whether firms engage in confusion to
soften competition. Surprisingly, we find that similar conditions for confusion to increase profits
apply with multi-product monopolists, even though competition-softening is obviously not an issue
in our context. More broadly, the issue of consumer confusion is related to a class of papers
that discuss how firms can exploit consumer näıveté.5 Most of this literature emphasizes the
competition-softening role of consumer confusion in duopoly. Exceptions are Petrikaitė (2018) and
Gamp (2019) who deal with the use of obfuscation techniques by a multiproduct monopolist. Both
papers address very different questions than we do, focusing on how a monopolist can manipulate
search costs to increase profits.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our benchmark model with uniformly
and independently distributed willingness-to pay and valuation differences. Section 3 provides the
results in this setting. Section 4 deals with a more general model, analyzing to which extent our
insights are robust. Section 5 discusses the welfare effects of confusion. Section 6 concludes.
2 Benchmark Model
We now introduce our benchmark model. In Section 2.1, we state the assumptions that we will
maintain throughout the paper, even when generalizing the benchmark model. Section 2.2 then
3More broadly related, several recent papers have revisited multiproduct pricing by monopolists (Amir et al.
(2016) and Armstrong and Vickers (2018)) and oligopolists (Nocke and Schutz (2018)), respectively. None of these
papers deals with the issue of choosing the product set.
4Their analysis is motivated by the emergence of consumer information apps such as Yelp.
5For instance, firms can use hidden fees (Gabaix and Laibson (2006); Heidhues et al. (2016)), spurious differenti-
ation resulting from the credulity of consumers (Spiegler, 2006), complex price formats (Carlin, 2009; Piccione and
Spiegler, 2012; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013), intransparent webpages (Ellison and Ellison, 2009), or higher consumer
search costs (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012).
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specifies distributional assumptions that only apply in the benchmark model. Section 2.3 discusses
the framework.
2.1 General Framework
A monopolist produces two goods i = 1, 2 at zero marginal cost; we abstract from fixed costs. There
is a unit mass of consumers indexed by k. We assume that the monopolist chooses a distribution
F of consumer valuations (v1, v2) ∈ R2, where his choice is restricted to some set F . We maintain
the following assumption unless otherwise mentioned.
Assumption 1. The set F consists of distributions F with supports SF ⊆ R2. These distributions
(i) are symmetric at the diagonal given by v1 = v2;
(ii) have the same average valuation V across consumers and products;
(iii) have a density f or finite support.
Parts (i) is a particularly stark way of expressing the horizontal relation between the different goods
– neither one of them has a systematic advantage over the other. (ii) implies that the monopolist
cannot influence the overall valuation (ii) by his activities. Such unbiasedness assumptions are
commonly used in the literature as a disciplining device.6 In a monopolistic setting, (ii) is partic-
ularly useful because it allows us to focus on non-trivial choices of the monopolist.7 By contrast,
Part (iii) of Assumption 1 is made for convenience only. For ease of exposition, we will focus on
the case with a density in the general analysis; the case with finite support will be used only in an
illustrative example in Section 4.3.
Moreover, the monopolist chooses a price vector p = (p1, p2) ∈ R2+. Each of the consumers buys at
most one of the two goods. A consumer k will acquire the alternative with the highest net utility
vi(k)− pi, i ∈ {1, 2} or choose an outside option with value normalized to 0. Thus, we obtain the
demand function for product i as
DFi (pi, pj) = Pr
F
(
vi(k)− pi ≥ max
{
vj(k)− pj , 0
})
, 8 (1)
where j 6= i and PrF (.) stands for the probability of the event given the valuation distribution
F . We first consider the monopolist’s choice of prices for fixed valuation distribution F . The firm
solves the following optimization problem:
max
p1,p2
ΠF (p1, p2) = p1D
F
1 (p1, p2) + p2D
F
2 (p2, p1) (2)
Once we have dealt with the pricing problem, we will ask how the monopolist optimally chooses
the valuation distribution from the set F . For the welfare analysis, we note that total surplus if F
6See the discussion in Hefti et al. (2020) for details.
7If the monopolist had the opportunity to increase average consumer valuations at zero cost, she would always
benefit from doing so.
8When F is finite, this expression has to be modified by introducing an assumption that the firms share the
demand of consumers for which vi(k)− pi = vj(k)− pj , equally.
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has a density is
TSF (p1, p2) = prob
(





∣∣v1 − p1 ≥ max{v2 − p2, 0}]+
prob
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∣∣v2 − p2 ≥ max{v1 − p1, 0}],
where E[...] is the expectation of the respective valuation conditional on that good being purchased.
Therefore,











(Net) Consumer surplus is
CSF (p1, p2) = TS
F (p1, p2)−ΠF (p1, p2). (4)
2.2 Distributional Assumptions of the Benchmark Model
We illustrate our ideas in a simple benchmark model. We start with the observation that the
preferences of a consumer with valuation vector (v1(k), v2(k)) can equivalently be characterized by
his average willingness-to-pay vk ≡ v1(k)+v2(k)2 and his valuation difference ∆(k) ≡ v2(k) − v1(k).
Next, we assume that vk is uniformly distributed on an interval [1−W, 1 +W ], where W captures
WTP-heterogeneity; in particular, the average WTP in the population, V , is 1. The valuation
difference ∆ is uniformly distributed on an interval [−2E, 2E] (independently of the average WTP);
where E captures the extent of valuation difference heterogeneity in the population. Thus the
valuation distribution has density f(E,W ) ≡ 18EW on its support [−2E, 2E]× [1−W, 1 +W ], and
it is symmetric in two ways. First, products are symmetric in the sense that average valuations are
the same for both goods. Second, the population is symmetric with respect to the average WTP,
so that upward deviations from the average WTP are equally likely as downward deviations of the
same size.
Figure 1 illustrates the monopolist’s demand at symmetric prices p, with total demand consisting
of the mass of all valuation vectors for which at least one good has a value of at least p.9 The
figure distinguishes between three different cases. In all three cases, the rectangle with corners
(1 − W − E, 1 − W + E), (1 − W + E, 1 − W − E), (1 + W − E, 1 + W + E) and (1 + W +
E, 1 + W − E) describes the support of the joint valuation distribution. Case (a) assumes that
W < 1 − E, so that all consumers value both goods positively. The zero-cost assumption implies
that, in this case, serving all consumers would be efficient (maximize total surplus for the given
valuation distribution). We do not rule out that some consumers have negative valuations for one or




















(a) W < 1− E (b) 1− E < W < 1 (c) W > 1
Note: In each case, demand is determined by the size of the (shaded) region
of valuation vectors (v1, v2) with max(v1, v2) ≥ p.
Figure 1: The monopolist’s demand at symmetric prices
both goods: This will happen for sufficiently large WTP heterogeneity and/or valuation difference
heterogeneity (W > 1 − E): If 1 − E < W < 1 (Case (b)), then consumers with pronounced
preferences for one of the two goods may have negative valuations for the other good; if W > 1
(Case (c)), then some consumers even have negative valuations for both goods. We will restrict the
monopolist’s choices of valuation distributions as follows.
Assumption 2. The set F consists of all distributions corresponding to (E,W ) such that E ∈
[E,E] for some E ≥ E ≥ 0 and W ∈ [W,W ] for some W ≥ W ≥ 0. Unless otherwise mentioned,
we set E = W = 0.
The monopolist therefore faces substantive restrictions when choosing valuation distributions. She
cannot induce arbitrary valuation distributions. Because E = 0 corresponds to the case that both
goods are valued equally by each consumer, the assumption that E = 0 effectively implies that the
monopolist has the option to choose only one product. The assumption that W = 0 corresponds
to the case that the monopolist has the option to offer two goods that every consumer values the
same on average.
2.3 Discussion
We now discuss our framework. We first discuss two alternative interpretations to which it ap-
plies. Thereafter, we relate our concept of valuation difference heterogeneity to standard notions
of product differentiation.
2.3.1 Interpretation of the Choice Problem
We have two main interpretations of the monopolist’s choice of valuation distributions. First, one
may think of the monopolist as having access to an exogeneously given set I of goods i. For each of
these goods, each consumer k has some valuation vi(k), which we take as exogenously given for the
monopolist. However, we suppose that the monopolist has to select two of the goods (i = 1, 2) from
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for each consumer k, so that the monopolist effectively chooses a
distribution F of consumer valuations (v1, v2) ∈ R2. The restriction to the exogenously given set
F of distributions reflects the set of available products I and consumer preferences.
In the second interpretation, which we will return to in Section 5, the set of available products is
fixed. However, the monopolist can influence the consumers’ perceptions of products by choosing
her advertising and communication policies. We can then distinguish between true valuations,
which correspond to those actually experienced in consumption, and perceived valuations, which
correspond to those believed to be correct after exposure to firm communication. We ask whether
the monopolist wants to confuse consumers by distorting their perceptions or whether she aims
at limiting confusion. In this interpretation, the set F will correspond to the set of perceived
distributions that the monopolist can induce. The restrictions on the set of feasible distributions
will reflect the existence of an underlying distribution of true valuations which the monopolist
cannot credibly distort beyond limits.
In most of this paper, we will use the first interpretation of the monopolist’s choice of valuation
distribution. As far as monopoly profits and prices are concerned, this will make no difference.
When dealing with consumer surplus, more care will be necessary, as we will see in Section 5,
where we focus specifically on the welfare effects of confusion strategies on consumer surplus.
2.3.2 Valuation Difference Heterogeneity vs. Product Differentiation
Before returning to the main line of argument in Section 3, we clarify the relation between our
concept of valuation difference heterogeneity and the standard notion of product differentiation in
a locational model of the Hotelling type. We only sketch the argument here, the details are in
Appendix A.3.1. The model of Section 2.2 with W = 0 translates directly into a model where
the consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line, the products of the monopolist are
at the opposing ends of the line and the consumers face linear transportation costs that have to
be subtracted from the gross valuation for each product. In such a Hotelling model, a standard
way to capture increasing product differentiation would be an increase in transportation costs.
While such an increase does lead to higher valuation differences, it typically also reduces the
consumers’ overall valuation for the products – which contrasts with our definition of an increase
in valuation difference heterogeneity.10 Instead, an appropriate way to capture valuation difference
heterogeneity in the Hotelling setting is as the combined effect of an increase in transportation
costs and an (appropriately sized) simultaneous increase in gross valuation.
10An alternative way to capture product differentiation in a Hotelling setting is by an outward shift of the product
locations (for fixed consumer location). Again, such a change would potentially have the feature of reducing overall
valuations and therefore does not correspond to an increase in valuation difference heterogeneity.
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3 Results for the Benchmark Model
We now suppose the monopolist who faces a population of consumers can influence the valuation
distribution by choosing heterogeneity as captured in the parameters E and W , respectively. To
simplify the discussion of the intuition, we consider monotone dispersions of willingness-to-pay
and valuation differences, where the dispersion increases the deviation of the respective variable
from the average for each consumer proportionally. We ask how these changes affect prices, profits
and consumer surplus. The results will highlight conflicts of interest between consumers and the
firm. We write the total surplus and consumer surplus for symmetric prices (p1, p2) = (p, p)
and parameter values E and W as TS(p;E,W ) and CS(p;E,W ), respectively. Evaluated at
profit-maximizing prices p∗(E,W ), the surplus levels become TS∗(E,W ) := TS(p∗(E,W );E,W )
and CS∗(E,W ) := CS(p∗(E,W );E,W ). The total effect of a marginal change in the parameter












with all derivatives evaluated at p = p∗(E,W ).11 Here, we refer to ∂TS∂θ as the direct effect of
the parameter change and to ∂TS∂p
∂p∗
∂θ as the indirect effect. We use an analogous terminology for
consumer surplus CS.12 We start with the effect of higher valuation difference heterogeneity E.
Proposition 1. Consider the benchmark model of Section 2.2.
(i) An increase in valuation difference heterogeneity E has a positive direct effect on consumer
surplus; moreover, it increases profits and prices.
(ii) There exists a parameter region in which E has a negative total effect on consumer surplus.
The proposition is an immediate implication of Lemma A.1 in the appendix, which characterizes
the profit-maximizing price vector, and Lemma A.3, which characterizes consumer surplus. To
understand the intuition for (i), note that a monotone valuation dispersion increases the higher
of the two valuations for each consumer, which is the one determining the maximal price she is
prepared to pay. Accordingly, an increase in E has a positive direct effect on consumer surplus, and
it increases demand at fixed prices. As a result, it leads to higher profits. Moreover, the dispersion
increases prices because it not only increases demand, but simultaneously reduces the sensitivity of
demand to price changes: The uniform spread in the distribution means that there are less critical
consumers at any given price level, so that a marginal price increase reduces demand less than
before the dispersion.
Proposition 1(ii) reflects the intuition that this price increase counteracts the direct positive effect
of prices on consumer surplus: For those consumers who hardly benefit from the increasing hetero-
geneity, the adverse price effect dominates and they are worse off. As a result, it is possible that
net consumer surplus falls. Thus, in spite of the direct positive effect on consumer surplus, the
11The relevant derivatives generically exist; see Appendix A.1.1.
12For profits, the envelope theorem implies that there is no indirect effect, so that the total and direct effects of









Note: The shaded area consists of all (E,W)
for which a marginal increase in E decreases
consumer surplus (net of prices).
Figure 2: Consumer Surplus and Valuation Difference Heterogeneity ”E”
firm’s optimal (high) choice of the dispersion parameter E does generally not maximize consumer
surplus. Figure 2 illustrates this point. The figure highlights the parameter region in which (net)
consumer surplus is decreasing in E. The right border of the region therefore characterizes the
values of E that minimize net consumer surplus locally for fixed W . To the right of this line,
consumer surplus increases in E again. Thus, for fixed W , the profit-maximizing firm’s choice of E
(which, by Proposition 1(i), is E, the maximal available E) does not necessarily maximize consumer
surplus.13
The following proposition (illustrated in Figure 3) describes the more complex effect of increasing
WTP heterogeneity W .
Proposition 2. Consider the benchmark model of Section 2.2.
(i) The direct effect of W on consumer surplus is positive.
(ii) For any E ≥ 0, profits are first weakly decreasing in W ; beyond a threshold they become weakly
increasing; for any given E, the profit-maximizing price of the firm is W = W = 0 if W is below a
threshold W̃ (E) and W = W if W > W̃ (E).
(iii) For sufficiently small E ≥ 0, prices are U-shaped in W . For intermediate values of E, prices
are N-shaped in W (first increasing, then decreasing, then increasing); for high values of E, prices
are monotone increasing in W .
The clear monotonicity result (i) may seem surprising as the effect of W on an individual consumer’s
average WTP is positive if the WTP is above average and negative if it is below average. However,
as the consumers who buy at any given price are those with relatively high valuations, the former
effect is more important than the latter, resulting in the positive overall effect.14 Figure 3 illustrates
parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2. Below the dashed line Wmin(E), higher WTP heterogeneity
13This is most obvious for W between 0.2 and 0.33, where consumer surplus is monotone decreasing as long as
E is sufficiently small. For these W , assuming that E is sufficiently small, consumer surplus is maximal for E = 0,
whereas the firm wants to choose E as high as possible.
14This argument needs to be modified with more general distributions, where the average willingness to pay is
not symmetrically distributed; for instance, when high WTP-consumers are rare, then the adverse effect on low
WTP-consumers will dominate.
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weakly reduces profit.15 Above the dashed line, the firm’s profit is increasing in WTP heterogeneity.
It reaches the level corresponding to W = 0 again at W̃ (E), then increases further. Thus a firm will
either choose minimal heterogeneity or, if it has access to a sufficiently high level of heterogeneity,
it will choose the maximal available W . The result reflects the relation between W and demand.
Intuitively, for sufficiently low initial heterogeneity, the firm wants to keep a large share of consumers
on board, including some with below-average WTP. When W increases slightly, the WTP of these
marginal consumers (who have below-average WTP) falls, resulting in a lower total demand at the
given price and thus in lower profits. As W increases further, it will eventually cross a threshold
beyond which the price is set so high that only consumers with above-average valuation demand
the good. As their valuation is positively affected by a further increase in W , such an increase has














Note: In each region, an upward-pointing (downward-pointing)
arrow stands for a positive (negative) effect of a small increase
of W on the respective variable
Figure 3: Profits, Prices and WTP Heterogeneity
In the small shaded region near the origin in Figure 3, prices are decreasing in W ; outside that
region they are increasing. Thus, the relation between WTP heterogeneity W and prices is non-
monotone only for small values of E. To understand this relation, note that, as usual, an increase
in prices has a positive effect on revenue per consumer, but reduces demand. An increase in W
mitigates the latter effect, because it reduces the mass of marginal consumers for any given interior
price. Therefore, as shown in Figure 3, prices can be increasing in W even in a part of the region
where demand and profits are decreasing in W .
Proposition 2 illustrates the conflict between firm and consumers concerning the choice of WTP-
heterogeneity. Starting from low levels of W , profits fall. By contrast, the effect on consumer




, demand and thus profits are independent of W .
12
surplus may well be positive. As the direct effect of W on consumer surplus is everywhere positive
by part (i), the total effect must at least be positive in the area where prices are decreasing in
W (the shaded area in Figure 3; see part (iii)).16 Thus, consumers may want some heterogeneity
whereas the firm does not. For higher initial values of W , a different type of conflict may emerge,
because both profits and prices are increasing in W . The adverse price effect on consumer surplus in
this region may dominate the positive direct effect, so that the interests of the firm and consumers
are again not aligned – now it is the firm who prefers greater heterogeneity while consumers do not.
Figure A.5 in Appendix A.3.2 illustrates the areas where conflicts between profit maximization and
consumer surplus maximization emerge. In line with the above arguments, there is a region where
consumer surplus is increasing in WTP-heterogeneity, but profits are decreasing. Conversely, there
is a region where consumer surplus is decreasing in WTP-heterogeneity, but profits are increasing.
Whether the conflicts between firm and consumers result in a suboptimal choice of W from the
consumer perspective depends on the constraint set.17 If W is sufficiently large (above W̃ (E) for
the firm and above a line W̃CS(E) defined analogously for consumers), then profit maximization
and maximization of consumer surplus both demand choosing W = W , that is, as high as possible.
For smaller values of W , the optimal choice of the firm need not maximize total consumer surplus.
Comparison with Duopoly The effects of increasing heterogeneity for a multiproduct monop-
olist differ from those arising when each product is offered by a duopolist. We will illustrate this for
the standard case that competition is sufficiently intense that the duopoly market is fully covered.
As vi − vj is distributed uniformly on [−2E, 2E], in the full-coverage case, the duopoly version of
our model is equivalent to a Hotelling duopoly with firms located at L = −0.5 and L = 0.5 and
linear transportation cost t = 2E. Using standard arguments, the candidate equilibrium in this
case is pd = 2E.18 Full coverage requires 1 −W ≥ pd, so that the consumer with the minimal
valuation still buys one of the products. Hence, a necessary condition for existence of this equi-
librium is W ≤ 1 − 2E. In Appendix A.3.4, we show that this condition is also sufficient for this
full coverage equilibrium to exist. Equilibrium profits per firm are Π = t/2 = E. Thus, as long
as W ≤ 1 − 2E, prices and profits are monotone increasing in valuation difference heterogeneity
as in the monopoly case. Intuitively, increasing valuation difference heterogeneity softens compe-
tition, so that duopolists can safely increase prices. Contrary to the multi-product case, however,
sufficiently small changes of WTP heterogeneity have no effect: As W does not influence the mass
of indifferent consumers, prices and profits are independent of WTP heterogeneity. As soon as W
becomes high enough that the regime boundary is reached, it clearly does have an effect, as the
full-coverage equilibrium breaks down.
16Appendix A.3.2 provides a calculation of consumer surplus, as well as a graphical description of the areas where
W has negative or positive effects on consumer surplus, respectively.
17See Appendix A.3.2 for details.
18Note that this is not only true for W = 0, but for all W for which full coverage applies.
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4 General Valuation Distributions
In the following, we extend the analysis beyond our benchmark model by relaxing the independence
and uniformity assumptions on the valuation distribution. While several of the main insights of
the previous section generalize, others need to be qualified.
4.1 Assumptions and Terminology
We maintain the assumptions of Section 2.1. In addition, we introduce some further terminology
and assumptions. We continue to denote consumer k’s valuation difference as ∆(k) = v2(k)−v1(k)
and his average valuation or average willingness-to-pay (WTP) as v(k) ≡ v1(k)+v2(k)2 . Moreover,
we denote the average valuation across all consumers and goods as V . While this overall average
valuation is fixed across all distributions, the average valuation of an individual consumer for the
two goods may differ across distributions.
Definition 1. Fix some valuation distribution F ∈ F .
(i) An average valuation v is conceivable if there exists (v1, v2) in S
F such that v1+v22 = v.
(ii) A valuation difference ∆ is conceivable if there exists (v1, v2) in S
F such that v2 − v1 = ∆.
Thus, in the benchmark model, the overall average valuation is 1, but the conceivable average val-
uations of individual players are those in [1−W, 1 +W ]. The conceivable valuation differences are
those which are in [−2E, 2E]. Contrary to the benchmark model, we no longer assume that valu-
ation differences and average valuations are distributed independently of each other. Accordingly,
we now introduce the notation Gv and gv for the conditional distribution of valuation differences
and its density, respectively, induced by restricting average valuations to v1+v22 = v for some con-
ceivable v. The symmetry assumption for F from Assumption 1 directly translates into a symmetry
condition for gv:
gv is symmetric at zero for all v ≥ 0. (6)
Hence, for any given average valuation v and valuation advantage ∆ of good 2 over good 1, it
is equally likely that good 1 has the same valuation advantage over good 2. We further denote
the distribution of average valuations induced by F as F . Finally, for every conceivable valuation
difference ∆, we denote the distribution of average valuations conditional on ∆ as F∆, its density
as f∆, and its expectation as E(F∆).





of average valuations are identical.
(ii) Two valuation distributions F 1 and F 2 are valuation-difference-equivalent if the induced
distributions G1 and G2 of valuation differences v2(k)− v1(k) are identical.
WTP-equivalent distributions can differ only in the distribution of consumer valuation differences,
not in the distribution of their average WTP.19 Thus, in our benchmark model two WTP-equivalent
19For instance, if consumers’ positions are shifted from the interior of a Hotelling line towards the end, this induces
a WTP-equivalent dispersion of the valuation distribution.
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distributions have the same W , but not necessarily the same E. Conversely, valuation-difference-
equivalent distributions can differ only with respect to the WTP distribution, not with respect to
the distribution of valuation differences. In the benchmark model, E must therefore be the same
in both cases, but not W . We now introduce different notions of dispersion of valuations.
Definition 3. (i) Consider two WTP-equivalent valuation distributions F 1 and F 2 with corre-
sponding difference distributions G1 and G2. F 2 induces a valuation difference dispersion of
F 1 if, for every conceivable v and v2 > v1, G
2
v(v2 − v1) ≤ G1v(v2 − v1), with strict inequality for
(v1, v2) on a subset of S
F 1 with positive measure.





. F 2 induces a WTP dispersion of F 1 if the following prop-















∆(v) if v < E(F
1
∆), with strict inequalities for (v1, v2)
on a subset of SF
1
with positive measure.
As valuation differences are symmetrically distributed around zero, a valuation difference dispersion
makes the valuation differences more heterogeneous (while the WTP remains unchanged); gener-
alizing the increase in E in the benchmark model, it shifts mass from valuation profiles close to
the diagonal v1 = v2 to locations that are further away. Conversely, generalizing the increase in W
in the benchmark model, a WTP dispersion increases the heterogeneity of average valuations, but
does not affect valuation differences. Thus, it stretches valuation profiles along (parallel to) the
diagonal.
To avoid technicalities, we state the following assumption directly rather than in terms of distribu-
tional conditions. Again, the assumption holds in the benchmark model.
Assumption 3. Every valuation distribution F ∈ F is such that the firm’s maximization problem
has a unique solution, which involves symmetric prices (p∗(F ), p∗(F )).
Note that we do not explicitly require concavity of profit functions here, but we will impose it
where necessary.
4.2 Analysis
We first focus on the optimal choice of prices for a fixed valuation distribution. By Assumption 3,
the firm’s profit function simplifies to:
ΠF (p) = pPrF (max{v1, v2} ≥ p). (7)
We denote the profit resulting from this problem as Π∗(F ). In the case that F has a density, the
profit function becomes






























The first bracketed term is the benefit from serving inframarginal consumers at a higher price.
The second bracketed term captures the demand losses resulting from higher prices. The following
result is useful to understand the comparative statics of profits and prices, respectively.
Lemma 1. Consider the general model introduced in Section 4.1. Suppose F 2 6= F 1.
(i) If DF
2
(p∗(F 1), p∗(F 1)) > DF
1
(p∗(F 1), p∗(F 1)), where p∗(F 1) is the solution of the maximization
problem for F 1, then Π∗(F 2) > Π∗(F 1).






















f2(v1, v2)dv2dv1 − 2p∗(F 1)
∫ p∗(F 1)
0
f2(p∗(F 1), v2)dv2 > 0
Part (i) of Lemma 1 generalizes the logic underlying the profit effects in the benchmark model
where positive demand effects of increasing heterogeneity translated into increasing profits. This
logic holds for any demand increase because a monopolist can always react to increasing demand
by leaving prices unchanged – thus an activity that increases demand is always profitable. By (ii),
whether changes in valuation distributions increase prices depends on the effects on the mass of
inframarginal and marginal consumers, respectively. Intuitively, moving from F 1 to F 2 will increase
prices if, at the initial equilibrium with prices p∗(F 1), the marginal profit effect of increasing both
prices at the same time is positive. The first line of the expression in (ii) captures this marginal
profit effect; the second line translates it into a distributional condition.
4.3 Increasing Heterogeneity
We now suppose that F contains distributions that can be compared with respect to valuation
difference dispersion or WTP dispersion, and we ask how these dispersions affect prices, profits and
surplus.
Increasing valuation difference heterogeneity We immediately obtain the following result,
which generalizes the profit effect discussed in Proposition 1(i).
Proposition 3. Consider the general model introduced in Section 4.1. A valuation difference
dispersion has a positive direct effect on consumer surplus, and it strictly increases profits. In
particular, a profit-maximizing choice of F ∈ F must maximize valuation difference dispersion.
We only sketch the proof, which is straightforward. Intuitively (again arguing for a monotone
valuation difference dispersion as in the benchmark model), though the average valuation remains
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unchanged, a higher maximal willingness to pay, maxi∈1,2 vi(k), becomes more likely. Thus, for a
fixed symmetric price vector, demand and consumer surplus increase as well. For a multiproduct
monopolist who can sell at most one good to each consumer, the change is profitable.
Proposition 3 does not contain a statement about the relation between valuation difference hetero-
geneity and prices. Contrary to the benchmark model, higher valuation difference heterogeneity
does not necessarily induce higher prices. We provide an instructive discrete counterexample that
has the spirit of a Hotelling model.
Example 1 Suppose given two non-negative real numbers a1 and a2 such that a1 + a2 ≤ 1.
Consider the discrete valuation distribution F with prob(2, 0) = prob(0, 2) = a1, prob(1.5, 0.5) =
prob(0.5, 1.5) = a2 and prob(1, 1) = 1− 2a1 − 2a2 = a3. Table 1 shows demand and profits for the
three possible candidates for an optimal price.
Price Demand Profit
2 2a1 4a1
1.5 2a1 + 2a2 3a1 + 3a2
1 1 1







p1 = p2 = 1
p1 = p2 = 2











−2 −1 0 1 2
(a) Optimal Prices (b) Valuation Difference Distributions
Note: (a) depicts the parameter regions in which the respective optimal price
emerges. (b) displays distributions of valuation differences. In all cases a1 = 0.3,
whereas a2 = 0.1 (solid); a2 = 0.2 (dashed) and a2 = 0.05 (dotted).
Figure 4: Price Effects of Valuation Difference Heterogeneity: Counterexample
Using the right column of Table 1, it is straightforward to show how the optimal price depends on
the probabilities a1 and a2; Figure 4(a) depicts the regions in (a1; a2)-space where each of the three
17
prices is optimal. There are several ways to capture increasing valuation difference heterogeneity
in this parameterized example. We focus on the effect of increasing a2 at the expense of a3, while
keeping a1 fixed (that is, moving mass from zero valuation differences to small valuation differences),
because it is most subtle.20 When a1 is small (below 0.25), the increase in heterogeneity (higher
a2) weakly increases prices, as the firm eventually gives up serving indifferent consumers. When a1
is higher, the increase in heterogeneity weakly reduces prices, as the firm eventually gives up the
exclusive focus on consumers with very high valuation differences. Figure 4(b) illustrates the last
observation. For all three distributions depicted there, a1 = 0.3. The distribution captured by the
solid line corresponds to a2 = 0.1 (and thus a3 = 0.2). In Figure 4(a), it is represented by a point on
the boundary between the regions with equilibrium prices 2 and 1.5. For the dashed distribution,
which results from a valuation difference dispersion of the previous distribution (a2 = 0.2), the
profit-maximizing prices are p1 = p2 = 1.5, whereas for the dotted distribution, for which the
valuation difference dispersion is lower than for the original one (a2 = 0.05), the profit-maximizing
prices are p1 = p2 = 2. Contrary to the benchmark model with uniformly distributed valuation
differences, the effects of increasing heterogeneity depend on whether high valuation differences
become more common relative to low valuation differences or low valuation differences become
more common relative to no valuation differences. Prices tend to increase in the former case, but
not in the latter.
Increasing WTP heterogeneity We have seen in the benchmark model that profits are U-
shaped in WTP heterogeneity. We now want to use the more general setting to identify the
driving forces behind this result. To this end, we require an assumption on the set F of available
distributions. This assumption is satisfied in the benchmark model if we consider the set of all
(E,W ) for which E is fixed at some level, whereas W ∈ [0,W ] for sufficiently large W .
Assumption 4. The set F of valuation distributions has the following properties:
(i) F is parameterized as Fτ by τ ∈ [0, T ) for some T > 0, so that an increase in τ corresponds to
a WTP-dispersion.
(ii) The optimal price for Fτ , pτ , is a continuous function of τ .
(iii) There exists an open left neighbourhood of V ∈ R+ in which ΠF0(p) > ΠF0(V ).
(iv) Define V
max
as the maximum value of v1 among all (v1, v2) in the support of Fτ for some
τ ∈ [0, T ) for which the average valuation is V . Then there exists a τ∗ > 0 such that ΠFτ∗ (p) >
ΠFτ∗ (V
max
) for p in an open right neighbourhood of V
max
.
This assumption captures those features of the benchmark model which are decisive for the non-
monotone effect of WTP-heterogeneity: We show that the profit effect of WTP heterogeneity is
20Figure 4(a) immediately shows that two other increases in valuation difference heterogeneity weakly increase
prices. (i) An increase in a1 with a simultaneous reduction in a2 by the same amount, so that a3 remains fixed,
which corresponds to putting more mass on large valuation differences rather than on small valuation differences;
(ii) a proportional increase in a1 and a2 (a multiplication by the same factor above 1); graphically, this shifts out
(a1, a2) along a ray from the origin, moving mass away from identical valuations to small as well as large valuation
differences.
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negative when dispersion is sufficiently small and positive when dispersion is large.
Proposition 4. Suppose that F satisfies Assumption 4 and that ΠF (p) is strictly concave. Then,
starting from F0, the WTP dispersion resulting from a marginal increase of τ reduces profits. For
sufficiently high initial levels of WTP-heterogeneity (τ > τ∗), a further dispersion increases profits.
Intuitively, Assumption 4(iii) requires that average valuations have to be sufficiently high. It
guarantees that, with minimal WTP heterogeneity (τ = 0), the firm sets its price in such a way
that all consumers whose WTP is at least average buy (as well as some consumers with below-
average WTP), so that the dispersion reduces the valuations of every consumer who does not buy or
is indifferent. Moreover, there is a non-degenerate set of buyers whose valuation falls after a WTP-
dispersion. Hence, the dispersion reduces demand. Condition (iv) guarantees that, for sufficiently
high WTP heterogeneity, the price will be so high that the marginal buyer has an average valuation
above V . Increasing WTP therefore increases the gross consumer surplus of the marginal buyer
and thus increases demand and profits.21
4.4 Example: Independent Product Valuations
In the benchmark model, average valuations and valuation differences are distributed independently
of each other, but individual valuations are not. As another example of the general setting of Sec-
tion 4.1, we now deal with the converse case that product valuations are distributed independently
of each other, but average valuations and valuation differences are not. We assume that the set F
contains only distributions such that the individual valuation distributions for each good are i.i.d.
and uniform. The set of these single-good distributions is parameterized by an A ≥ 0; with A
corresponding to the uniform distribution on [1−A, 1 +A]. Thus, in contrast with the benchmark
model, there is only one parameter capturing heterogeneity: As A increases, consumers simulta-
neously become more heterogeneous with respect to willingness-to-pay and valuation differences.
Moreover, WTP and valuation differences are clearly not distributed independently of each other.22
In Appendix A.3.3, we sketch the solution to this simple example. Figure 5 summarizes the main re-
sults. Prices and profits are both non-monotone (U-shaped) in A. Comparison with the benchmark
model is instructive. There, prices and profits are both increasing in valuation difference hetero-
geneity, but usually not for WTP-heterogeneity.23 Intuitively, the U-shaped relation between A
and prices as well as profits reflects the influence of WTP-heterogeneity, whereas the influence of
valuation difference heterogeneity is obscured. By comparison, our benchmark model thus has the
advantage that it makes the differences between both types of heterogeneity transparent.
Figure 5 also shows that the effect of A on consumer surplus is strictly positive. Again, the result
reflects the interplay of the effects of WTP-heterogeneity and valuation difference heterogeneity. As
21The result is closely related to the analysis of Johnson and Myatt (2006) for the single-product monopolist.
22For very high and very low WTP (near 1 +A and 1−A, respectively), the valuation differences are concentrated
on a small interval compared with the case that the WTP is intermediate (closer to 1).
23Recall that profits were decreasing in W for low values of W and arbitrary E, whereas prices were only decreasing















Note: The figure describes equilibrium prices, profits,
total surplus and consumer surplus as functions of A
Figure 5: Example: Independent Product Valuations
we saw in the benchmark model, each type of heterogeneity can have negative effects on consumer
surplus. By aggregating the two sources of heterogeneity in one parameter, these subtleties are
obliterated. Essentially, the positive effects of heterogeneity in one dimension dominate the negative
effects in the other dimension.
5 The Welfare Effects of Confusing Consumers: A Taxonomy
We have argued that our framework can represent a firm’s product choice or its communication
strategy towards consumers. So far, however, we have focused on the former interpretation. We
now discuss how the framework can shed light on communication strategies. To this end, we assume
that the firm can choose these strategies in such a way that they potentially affect each consumer’s
perception of the value of each good, without having any effect on the true value of the good. The
latter restriction is a natural disciplining device to guarantee that manipulating perceptions comes
at a cost, which has many well-known analogues in the literature (see the discussion in Hefti et al.
(2020)). More precisely, the true valuation distribution is now exogenously fixed at F0, but the firm
can select a valuation distribution from some set F . Each choice thus corresponds to a different
distribution of perceived valuations. We assume that each consumer makes his consumption decision
based on these perceived valuations. Thus, he is taking the perceived valuation for granted, without
questioning whether it might have been manipulated by the firm. Therefore, from the firm’s
perspective, the effect of choosing a certain distribution of perceived valuations from F is entirely
analogous to the effect of choosing a distribution of true valuations. Hence, all our previous results
on profits and prices directly carry over to the new interpretation. The differences exclusively
concern the results on consumer surplus. For definiteness, we suppose that full revelation is feasible:
Assumption 5. The set F contains the distribution F0 of true valuations.
Together with Assumption 1, Assumption 5 means that all communication strategies induce the
true valuation on average. However, in addition to the true distribution, the firm can induce
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distributions of perceived valuations where some or all consumers misperceive the valuations of the
goods at the moment of purchase. Then, for any consumer who would have bought the good under
the truthful strategy as well as under the distorted strategy at the given price, confusion has no
effect on the utility from consumption. This contrasts with the case of product choice analyzed
before where we assumed that the firm’s choices actually affect true valuations.
The firm’s communication decisions can nevertheless potentially affect consumer surplus through
three different channels. First, following the logic of Sections 3 and 4, the choice of the distribution
of (perceived) valuations affects prices, so that it even influences net consumer surplus for those
consumers whose consumption decision it does not affect. Second, even without any price effect,
the communication strategy can affect whether a consumer purchases the good: A consumer may
be misled into buying if the perceived valuation is higher than the true valuation; conversely, he
may be misled into abstaining from consumption if the perceived valuation is lower than the true
valuation. Third, the communication strategy can affect which good the consumer buys: It can bias
some consumers in favor of one good and others in favor of the other. In the following, we will discuss
the role of these channels in more detail for three different classes of obfuscating communication
policies. We will carry out the entire discussion below in the context of the benchmark example
(with the obvious reinterpretation that the valuation distributions reflect the firm’s communication
policy).
5.1 Exaggerating Valuation Differences
First, we suppose that the firm can (only) affect the consumers’ perceptions of the difference be-
tween the valuations for the two products, thereby creating a valuation difference dispersion. We
assume that the set F of available distributions of perceived valuations can be totally ordered
by valuation difference heterogeneity, with a minimum and a maximum, where the minimum cor-
responds to the truthful policy. Because the firm benefits from greater dispersion of perceived
valuation differences, it will choose the maximum instead. There are several channels through
which this strategy may adversely affect consumers. First, at least in the benchmark model, the
firm will choose higher prices as perceived valuations become more dispersed (keeping average val-
uations fixed); see Proposition 1. Second, the confusion strategy will induce some consumers to
buy at some given price when they should have abstained from consumption, as they overestimate
the value of their preferred good. For monotone valuation dispersions, there are no other effects
on consumer welfare. Clearly, when valuation differences are exaggerated, no consumer will per-
ceive the valuation of his preferred product as lower than it is, so that confusion does not induce
consumers to abstain from consumption when they should buy. Similarly, because the preferred
product is not affected by the confusion strategy, a pure exaggeration of valuation differences does
not induce consumers to buy the wrong good.
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5.2 Exaggerating WTP differences
Next, we suppose that, through its communication and advertising strategies, the firm can increase
its appeal to some consumers, at the cost of making it appear less attractive to others. Specifically,
a less truthful communication strategy increases the perceived values of both goods for consumers
with above-average valuations and decreases them for consumers with below-average valuation, thus
exaggerating WTP differences.24 Accordingly, we assume that the set F of available distributions
of perceived valuations can be totally ordered by WTP heterogeneity. For definiteness, we again
assume that F has a minimum and a maximum with respect to WTP heterogeneity, with the
minimum corresponding to truthful communication.
Clearly, as such communication strategies do not affect perceived valuation differences, they cannot
induce a consumer to buy the wrong good. However, it might appear that, by exaggerating WTP
differences, that is, by increasing the dispersion of the distribution of perceived WTP, the firm
will induce some low-valuation consumers to exit the market, even though, according to their true
valuations they should purchase one of the goods. However, this argument fails to take the firm’s
incentives into account. We know from Sections 3 and 4 that, contrary to valuation difference
heterogeneity, the firm does not necessarily want WTP heterogeneity. More precisely, according to
Lemma 1, the firm wants WTP heterogeneity only if this increases demand, keeping prices fixed.
This corresponds to situations where the firm focuses on high-valuation consumers whose perceived
valuations increase as a result of greater dispersion. It is easy to see that, in the benchmark
example, the parameter region for which higher W increases profits is W > 1 + E/2. In this
region, the optimal price is p = 2W+E+24 > 1. Thus, the firm only sells to consumers with above-
average valuations. These consumers will have higher perceived valuations than under the true
valuation distribution, so that, at the given price, they will never abstain from buying as a result
of a WTP heterogeneity exaggeration strategy voluntarily adopted by a profit-maximizing firm.
Thus, at least in this example, apart from price increases, if a firm optimally chooses to exaggerate
WTP differences, this can only affect consumers by misleading some to buy a good when they
should rather not buy at all. We therefore cannot take it for granted that a firm will confuse some
consumers in such a way that they erroneously abstain from buying.
5.3 Noisy Information
So far, we assumed that confusion strategies work by simultaneously exaggerating positive and
negative opinions of consumers. An alternative approach has been suggested by Hefti et al. (2020)
who assume that (duopolistic) firms can add noise to the perception of valuation differences, which
is independent of a consumer’s true preferences. Thus, contrary to the assumptions of Section
5.1, consumers with true preferences for one good will not necessarily have stronger perceived
preferences for this good as a result of confusion; the valuation difference may be perceived as
smaller than it is, or it may even shift sign, so that a consumer is fooled into believing he prefers
24By reversing the arguments, the analysis applies to the opposite case that the true WTP difference distribution
is dispersed and the firm can use communication to make these differences less visible.
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the ”wrong” good. As argued in much detail in Hefti et al. (2020) for the duopoly case, various
common marketing activities have such effects. Firms may generate information overload for their
consumers, for instance, by making products unnecessarily complex or relying on intransparent
product labels. They may hide important information to impede product comparison or they may
describe their products in a vague way. This can lead to noisy perceptions of relative product
valuations. To formalize the relevant dispersion concepts, we assume as in the benchmark case that
the willingness-to-pay and the valuation differences are independently distributed of each other.
However, we do not impose uniformity.
Definition 4. An unbiased valuation difference confusion activity is described by a random
variable ε = (ε1, ε2) drawn from a symmetric distribution Φ on R with density φ and mean 0. As
a result of the confusion activity, perceived valuations differences are distributed as F̃ = F + Φ.
Therefore, an unbiased valuation difference confusion activity adds noise to the true valuations,
without affecting average valuations. It does not affect WTP, and it does not systematically
increase or decrease valuation differences. For some consumers, it makes one good more attractive,
for others the other one.
5.3.1 Results
Incentives for confusion will turn out to depend on properties of the true valuation distribution.
The following definition specifies the relevant properties.25 In this definition, we suppose the true
valuation difference distribution, conditional on the average valuation being v, is given as G0v, with
density g0v and support [−Ev, Ev] for some Ev > 0.
Definition 5. (i) (Indecisiveness) True preferences are indecisive if g0v is strictly increasing
on [−Ev, 0] and strictly decreasing on [0, Ev] for every conceivable v.
(ii) (Polarization) True preferences are polarized if g0v is strictly decreasing on [−Ev, 0] and
strictly increasing on [0, Ev] for every conceivable v.
Thus, with indecisive preferences, small valuation differences are more likely than larger valuation
differences, and conversely with polarized preferences. Proposition 3 has immediate implications for
the firm’s incentive to engage in confusion. The conclusion depends on the shape of the distribution
of true valuation differences.
Proposition 5. (i) With indecisive preferences, unbiased valuation difference confusion strictly
increases profits.
(ii) With polarized preferences, unbiased valuation difference confusion strictly reduces profits.
The result is intuitive. With indecisive preferences, for any fixed average valuation, valuation
profiles arise more frequently the closer to indifference they are. For any given price threshold,
adding noise to the true valuation distribution thus tends to make more consumers believe their
25The definition is a slight modification of the corresponding definition in Hefti et al. (2020).
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maximal valuation is beyond the threshold when it actually is not than vice versa. As a result,
demand and profits increase. Conversely, when preferences are polarized, adding noise reduces
demand and thus profits.26 When the firm selects a confusion strategy, this will have qualitatively
different welfare effects than when valuation differences of WTP-differences are exaggerated. It can
now happen that consumers abstain from buying even though it would be optimal for them to buy,
and it is also possible that consumers are confused into buying the wrong product.
6 Conclusions
This paper deals with a multiproduct monopolist’s incentives to engage in marketing activities that
affect consumers’ valuation distributions, and we identify the effects of these choices on consumer
surplus. The firm unambiguously benefits from greater consumer heterogeneity with respect to
valuation differences between the two goods. While consumers benefit from the resulting increase
in the value of the preferred good, they may suffer from higher prices set by the firm. We also
find that a multiproduct monopolist aims at extreme distributions of willingness-to-pay, favoring
very homogeneous and very heterogeneous populations relative to intermediate cases, while the
price effects are more complex. Again, we identify conflicts of interests between the firm and its
consumers with respect to the desirable amount of heterogeneity.
Applied to communication strategies, our results show that a multiproduct firm usually wants to
engage in activities that exaggerate valuation difference heterogeneity, whereas the case for ex-
aggerating willingness-to-pay heterogeneity is less clear. Either way, the firm might then induce
consumers to buy a product where they should not. Moreover, the firm only wants to engage in
confusion activities that introduce noise into valuation differences if the true valuations in the popu-
lation display indecisiveness, meaning that they are concentrated around indifference. If preferences
are polarized, meaning that indifference is relatively rare, a firm wants to educate consumers about
relative valuations. Surprisingly, this conclusion is similar to Hefti et al. (2020) who show that
duopolists only confuse consumers if preferences are indecisive (rather than polarized), because
this softens competition. Here we find similar results without competition, reflecting the demand
effects of confusion.
26The logic of Proposition 5 can be adjusted to apply to the case that confusion affects only WTP, while leaving
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Heidhues, Paul, Botond Kőszegi, and Takeshi Murooka, “Inferior products and profitable deception,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 2016, 84 (1), 323–356.
Johnson, Justin P and David P Myatt, “On the simple economics of advertising, marketing, and
product design,” American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (3), 756–784.
Nocke, Volker and Nicolas Schutz, “Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach,”
Econometrica, 2018, 86 (2), 523–557.
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A Appendix
This appendix contains three parts. Section A.1 proves the propositions of the benchmark model
stated in the main text. Section A.2 gives proofs for the results of the general model. Finally, in
Section A.3, we provide formal details of those parts of the analysis that were only sketched in the
main text.
A.1 The Benchmark Model
In the following, we prove the results for the benchmark model. We start with some auxiliary
results, before we prove Propositions 1 and 2.
A.1.1 Auxiliary Results: Prices and Surplus
For later reference, we first provide the characterization of the profit-maximizing (symmetric) price
vector on which the results in Section 3 rely.
Lemma A.1. (a) If W ≥ 12E + 13 (Region H), the profit-maximizing price is p∗ = 2W+E+24 .





12EW + (1−W )2 + 2
3
(1−W ).
(c) If W ≤ 12E − 12 (Region L), the profit-maximizing price is p∗ = 1+E2 .
In Figure A.1, we illustrate the parameter regions referred to in Lemma A.1. The shaded area
depicts the parameter region with non-negative valuations for all consumers, s.t. E +W ≤ 1. The
dotted line separates the parameter region according to which side of the rectangle forming the











Note: The figure describes the parameter
regions corresponding to parts (a), (b) and
(c) of Lemma A1, respectively
Figure A.1: Parameter regions from Lemma A.1
Proof. We start with the details for the case that
W ≥ E/2, (10)
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1-W 1-W+E 1+W 1+W+E
MP1 H
P
1-W 1+W 1-W+E 1+W+E
MP2 L
P
(a) W ≥ E2 (b) W ≤ E2
Note: The figure describes the equilibrium price regions used in
the derivation/proof of the results of Lemma A1 and in Table 2.
Figure A.2: Optimal Price Regions
Step 1: For W ≥ E/2, the demand function is given as
D(p, p) =

1 if p ≤ 1−W




4W if 1−W + E ≤ p ≤ 1 +W
(1+W+E−p)2
4EW if 1 +W ≤ p ≤ 1 +W + E
0 if 1 +W + E ≤ p
. (11)
To see this, note that demand at price p is the probability that max{v1, v2} ≥ p, which is the
ratio between the area of the set of valuations in the support satisfying this condition and the
total area of the rectangle, which is 8EW . Obviously, for p ≤ 1 −W = W ) demand is 1 and for
p ≥ 1 +W +E = W ) it is 0. For the remaining regions, which correspond to different positions of
p relative to the corner points in Figure A.2(a), demand is easily calculated as in (11).28
The following Steps 2-5 investigate potential candidate optima in each of the four intervals for
which demand is positive.
Step 2: For W ≥ E/2, there is no maximum with p ≤ 1−W .
This statement is trivial unless W < 1, in which case the only candidate is p = 1 − W . Us-





1−W < p < 1−W+E. The derivative of this expression with respect to p is positive for p = 1−W .
Step 3: For W ≥ E/2, a maximum with 1 − W < p ≤ 1 − W + E exists if and only if
27In Figure 1, this case applies in Region H and in the upper part of region M.
28For W > E/2, the price intervals given in Condition (11) are all non-degenerate. For W = E/2 we have
1−W + E = 1 + W , so that the third of the five cases in (11) is superfluous.
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12EW + (1−W )2 + 2
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(1−W ).
Obviously, a maximum in this region can only exist if W < 1 + E. Using the second sub-




. Hence, the first-order condition is
4pW−2W−4WE−4p+3p2+W 2+1 = 0. Straightforward calculations show that the unique candi-





12WE − 2W +W 2 + 1− 23W + 23
)
.
This price always satisfies p > 1 −W and it satisfies 1 −W + E ≥ p if and only if W ≤ E2 + 13 .
The resulting equilibrium candidate can easily be shown to be global optimum under the given
parameter conditions.29
Step 4: For W ≥ E/2, a maximum with 1−W+E < p < 1+W exists if and only if W > E/2+1/3.
It is given by
p =
2W + E + 2
4
Using (11), profit in this region is p2+2W−2p+E4W . The first-order condition immediately gives a
candidate solution p = 2W+E+24 , which satisfies the second-order condition. For this candidate,
1+W −p > 0 always holds, whereas p− (1−W +E) > 0 only holds if W > E/2+1/3, which holds
by assumption. The resulting equilibrium candidate can easily be shown to be global optimum
under the given parameter conditions.30
Step 5: For W ≥ E/2, there is no maximum with p ≥ 1 +W .
Using (11), the profit in [1+W, 1+W+E] is p (1+W+E−p)
2
4EW . The first-order condition has p =
1+W+E
3
as a unique solution. Since W ≥ E/2, it follows that the candidate solution satisfies p < 1 +W , so
that there can be no interior solution. As p = 1+W+E yields zero demand, the only candidate for a







as 1−W +E ≤ p < 1 +W . Inserting p = 1 +W gives ∂Π∂p =
E−2(1+W )
4W < 0, so that this deviation
is profitable.
These arguments prove Lemma A.1(a); they also show that (b) would hold as long as W ≥ E/2.
We now turn to the case that
W < E/2. (12)
The steps and arguments for this case are similar as in the previous analysis; the main difference is
that under condition (12) 1−W + E ≥ 1 +W , which corresponds to Figure A.2(b). The demand
function (Step 1) differs slightly from (11), Step 2 remains identical and in Step 3-5 the resulting
parameter conditions are adjusted accordingly (see Figure A.2(b):
Step 1’: For W < E/2, the demand function is given as
29The parameter region corresponds to the part of region M in Figure A.1, which lies above the dotted line.




1 if p ≤ 1−W
1− (p−1+W )24EW if 1−W ≤ p ≤ 1 +W
1+E−p
E if 1 +W ≤ p ≤ 1−W + E
(1+W+E−p)2
4EW if 1−W + E ≤ p ≤ 1 +W + E
0 if 1 +W + E ≤ p
(13)
Step 3’: For W < E/2, a maximum with 1−W ≤ p < 1+W exists if and only if W > E/2−1/2.
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(1−W )
The arguments are similar to those in Step 3 above.31
Step 4’: For W < E/2, a maximum with 1 + W ≤ p ≤ 1 −W + E exists if and only if W ≤




The arguments are similar as in Step 4 above.32
Step 5’: For W < E/2, there is no maximum with p ≥ 1−W + E.
The arguments follow those for Step 5 above.
The remaining results of Lemma A.1 now follow.
Next, we turn towards total surplus. We summarize the relation between parameter regions and
price regions (that is, the position of the optimal price relative to the corners of the support as in
Figures A.2) in Table 2. In this table, we divide region M into regions M1 and M2 according to
whether W ≥ E/2 or W ≤ E/2.33
Parameter W ≥ E2 + 13 E2 + 13 > W ≥ E/2 E/2 > W > E2 − 12 E2 − 12 ≥W
Regions Region H Region M1 Region M2 Region L
Lemma A1 Step 4 Lemma A1 Step 3 Lemma A1 Step 3’ Lemma A1 Step 4’
Price [1−W + E, 1 +W ] [1−W, 1−W + E] [1−W, 1 +W ] [1 +W, 1−W + E]




Table 2: Relation between parameter regions and price regions (derived from Lemma A.1)
Since we are primarily interested in local behavior around the firm’s optimum, we state the next
lemma accordingly: For each of the parameter Regions R ∈ {L,M,H}, we provide concrete ex-
31The parameter region where this price emerges is the part of the area M in Figure A.1 for which W < E/2.
32The resulting parameter region is Region L, in Figure A.1. Observe that, since W ≥ 0 by assumption, this region
only occurs for E ≥ 1. This price can therefore only ever be optimal, when we allow for negative valuations, i.e.
W + E > 1.
33The result follows from Steps 3, 4, 3’ and 4’ in Lemma A.1.
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pressions for the total surplus TSR = TSR(p;W,E) that apply for prices p that are interior in the
corresponding price region RP (depicted in Table 2), i.e. for p near the optimum p∗(W,E) derived
in Lemma A.1.





E2 + 3(1 +W )(1 +W + E)− 3p2
)
.





W 3 − 3W 2 + 3W
(
1 + 4E + 2E2
)
+ 3p2(1−W )− 2p3 − 1
)
.





W 2 + 3E(2 + E)− 3p2 + 3
)
.
Proof. To obtain the general expressions for total surplus at given prices, we note that it results
from integrating the maximal valuations of those consumers who actually buy at those prices.
Thus, the total surplus from consumers with v1 ≥ v2, which, by symmetry is half of total surplus









Here b1(v1) and b2(v1) are the lower and upper bounds of the area in (v1, v2)-space for which (v1, v2)
is in the support of F . For these functions we obtain:
b1(v1) =
{
−v1 + 2(1−W ) if v1 ∈ [1−W, 1−W + E]




v1 if v1 ∈ [1−W, 1 +W ]
−v1 + 2(1 +W ) if v1 ∈ [1 +W, 1 +W + E]
(15)
Using this logic, it is straightforward to calculate the expressions for total surplus.



















E2 + 3(1 +W )(1 +W + E)− 3p2
)
.
For Region M1, the price region is M
P
























W 3 − 3W 2 + 3W
(
1 + 4E + 2E2
)




The same expression applies for Region M2 by taking into account that M
P
2 = [1 − W, 1 + W ]



















W 2 + 3E(2 + E)− 3p2 + 3
)
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We start with the results on firm profits in part (i) of the proposition. By symmetry, the profit is








12WE + (1−W )2 + 23(1−W ) for W ∈
(
1
2E − 12 , 12E + 13
)
1+E
2 for W ≤ E2 − 12
To obtain demands at these profit-maximizing prices, we note that demand function (11) applies in
Region H (where D(p, p) = E+2(1+W−p)4W ) and in the part of Region M for which W ≥ E/2 (where
D(p, p) = 1− (p−(1−W ))24EW ), whereas (13) applies in Region L (where D(p, p) =
1+E−p∗
E ) and in the























for W ≤ E2 − 12
(16)







This proves the results for the firm in part (i) of the proposition.
Next, we consider the results on consumer surplus in part (i) and (ii) of the proposition. We are
primarily interested in local behavior around the firm’s optimum and state the lemma accordingly:
Using Lemma A.2 and the profit expression (16), we obtain consumer surplus for parameters in
Region R ∈ {L,M,H}, denoted as CSR = CSR(p;W,E) = TSR −ΠR:





E2 + 3E(1− p+W ) + 3(1− p+W )2
)
31







2E2 − 4E(p− 1) + (p− 1)2
)
+ 3(p− 1)W 2 + (p− 1)3 +W 3
)





3(1 + E − p)2 +W 2
)
Finally, we use Lemma A.3 to show how consumer surplus depends on parameters. Standard
calculations show that ∂CS(p;W,E)∂E > 0 always holds, so that the direct effect of E on consumer
surplus is positive (as claimed in Part (i) of the proposition. To capture the total effect of E on




12EW + (1−W )2. (18)
Straightforward calculations show that ∂CS
∗
∂E > 0 in Regions H and L. In Region M,
∂CS∗
∂E < 0 if
and only if
[
2(−1 + s(E,W ))−W
(
− 8 + 12E(−1 +W )2 + 6s(E,W ) + 9E2(32W − 9s(E,W ))+
2W
(
6− 3s(E,W ) +W (−4 +W + s(E,W ))
))]
> 0
It is straightforward to show the requirement of part (ii) of the proposition that there exist pa-
rameter values for which the last condition holds; these parameter values correspond to the shaded
areas in Figure 2.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Using Lemma A.3, we get ∂CS
R(p;W,E)
∂W for each RegionR ∈ {L,M,H}. Evaluating the derivatives
at the respective optimal price p∗(W ;E) (see Lemma A.1) in the respective relevant region R, simple
calculations show that ∂CS
R(p;W,E)
∂W > 0 always holds and the functions CS
R(p;W,E) coincide at
the regime boundaries. Therefore the direct effect of W on consumer surplus is positive.
(ii) Simple calculations show that ∂Π
∗
∂W < 0 in region M. In region H,
∂Π∗
∂W ≥ 0 if and only if
W ≥ 0.5E + 1. In region L, the profit is independent of W . Putting these results together, we find
that profits are (weakly) decreasing in W below the threshold W = 0.5E + 1 (depicted in Figure
3), where the minimum obtains, and increasing above the threshold.
Next, we show how the global maximum depends on the feasible W . From the above result, the
first candidate is the minimal choice of W , i.e. by Assumption 2, W = W = 0. To prove the claim
in the proposition, it now suffices to show that for every E ≥ 0 there exists a W̃ (E) > 0.5E + 1 so









p∗(0, E), p∗(0, E); 0, E
)
By Lemma A.1, Π(p∗(W̃ (E), E), p∗(W̃ (E), E; W̃ (E), E) = (2+E+2W̃ )
2
32W̃
, given that (W̃ (E), E) is in
region H ∀E. The expression for Π(p∗(0, E), 0, E) depends on the region: For E < 1, (0, E) is in
region M so that Π(p∗(0, E), 0, E) = 1. For E ≥ 1, (0, E) is in region L so that Π(p∗(0, E), 0, E) =
(1+E)2
4E .
34 Straightforward calculations yield the line W̃ (E) depicted in Figure 3:
W̃ (E) =
12(6− E + 4
√
2− E) for E ∈ [0, 1]
(2+E)2
2E for E ≥ 1
(iii) To understand the price effect, note from Lemma A.1 that ∂p
∗
∂W = 0 in Region L and
∂p∗
∂W > 0
in Region H. In Region M, ∂p
∗
∂W < 0 if and only if 6E ≤ 1−W + 2
√
(1−W )2 + 12EW .
A.2 Proofs of General Results
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) As the firm can always choose p∗(F 1) together with distribution F 2, we obtain
Π∗(F 2) ≥ p∗(F 1)DF 2(p∗(F 1), p∗(F 1)) > p∗(F 1)DF 1(p∗(F 1), p∗(F 1)) = Π∗(F 1) .




∗(F 1)) > ∂Π
F1
∂p (p
∗(F 1)). The condition in (ii) makes sure this requirement holds.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Denote the maximum and minimum of v1 and v2 as v
max and vmin, respectively. By definition,
a valuation difference dispersion corresponds to a first-order stochastic dominance shift of the
distribution of vmax−vmin for fixed average valuation. Denote the distribution of the second-order








same for F 2 and F 1, a valuation difference dispersion from F 1 to F 2 therefore also induces a first-
order shift of F i(2), and thus increases average gross consumer surplus. As 1−F 2(2)(p) > 1−F 1(2)(p)
for every p, the valuation difference dispersion increases demand. Thus by Lemma 1(i), it increases
profits.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Together with strict concavity, Assumption 4(iii) implies that the optimal price p(0) for τ = 0
satisfies p(0) < V . Thus, the marginal buyers have average valuations below V , and a WTP
dispersion reduces these marginal buyer’s WTP and thus demand. By Assumptions 4(i) and 4(ii),





the same profit and hence corresponds to the minimal choice of W .
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after a sufficiently small increase in τ , the new marginal buyer will still have marginal valuations
below V , so that further marginal increases in WTP-heterogeneity reduce demand and profits.
Next, note that the highest price at which some buyer with average valuation will still buy is
p = V
max
. Starting from this price, the marginal effect of a price increase on profits under Fτ∗
is positive by Assumption 4(iv). Thus, for this Fτ∗ it is profitable to increase prices to a level at
which no consumer with average valuation buys. Then a further increase in WTP heterogeneity
will increase the marginal buyer’s maximal willingness to pay and therefore increase demand and
profit.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Fix a conceivable average true valuation v. Suppose for given v the difference of the noise terms
is distributed as Gv. Suppose the support of Gv is given as [−Ev, Ev] for some Ev > 0. For any fixed
price p, denote the valuation difference of the critical consumer who is indifferent between buying
good 1 and not buying it as ∆∗ ≡ ∆∗(p, v). Suppose that ∆∗ > 0; the case that ∆∗ < 0 is analogous.
The consumers whose perceived valuation difference increases from below ∆∗ to above ∆∗ due to




∗ −∆))d∆. Similarly, the mass of consumers whose
valuations fall from above ∆∗ to below ∆∗ due to obfuscation are those with ∆ ∈ (∆∗,∆∗+Ev) and
−ε > ∆−∆∗; the corresponding mass is
∫ ∆∗+Ev
∆∗ gv(∆)(1−Gv(∆∗−∆))d∆. Indecisiveness implies
that the former term is larger than the latter, so that the number of consumers who mistakenly
buy the good as a result of obfuscation is larger than the number of consumers who mistakenly do
not buy. Integrating over all conceivable v shows that confusion increases total demand and profits
when preferences are indecisive.
(ii) is analogous.
A.3 Additional Details
We now substantiate several of the claims made in Sections 2 and 3 for the benchmark model.
A.3.1 Valuation Difference Heterogeneity vs. Product Differentiation
We compare our framework with a Hotelling model, where consumers are uniformly distributed
on the interval [−0.5, 0.5], with consumer k located at x(k). Product 1 is located at −L, product
2 at L for some L > 0. Consumer k has utility vmax − t|x(k) + L| for some t > 0 when buying
product 1, vmax − t|x(k) − L| when buying product 2, where vmax > 0 is the gross valuation for
the product (commonly shared by all consumers). Our model with W = 0 and E > 0 is equivalent
with a Hotelling Model with vmax = 1 + E, L = 0.5 and t = 2E.
The short line in Figure A.3(a) shows the support for our benchmark model with W = 0 and
E = 0.25 (or equivalently, the Hotelling model with vmax = 1.25, L = 0.5 and t = 0.5). A
standard way to capture greater product differentiation in the Hotelling model is by an increase in
t. The longer line in Figure A.3(a) shows how the support of the valuation distribution changes as t
34
increases from 0.5 to 1: The length of the support increases because consumers attach larger value
differences to the products. Crucially, however, the support also moves closer to the origin: As t
increases, match values fall. Thus, contrary to an increase in valuation difference heterogeneity in
our model, an increase in transportation costs reduces average valuations.
Alternatively, one can capture changes in differentiation through changes in product location. The
upper of the two solid straight lines in Figure A.3(b) corresponds to the benchmark case in which
t = 0.5 and L = 0.5; the lower solid line corresponds to L = 1. Like an increase in t, the increase in L
(an outward shift of the product locations for fixed consumer locations), shifts the support towards
the origin, in this case, without the simultaneous increase in the length of the line. Thus, there is
no increase in valuation difference heterogeneity. Intuitively, here products are differentiated in a
way that is excessive, resulting in lower valuations for every consumer. Conversely, a reduction in
product differentiation, where the products are moved into the interior of the interval [−0.5, 0.5]
leads to a support that is only piecewise linear (see the red line, which is drawn for L = 0.25).35
Again, this change has an effect on average valuation differences.
These considerations show that, in the Hotelling Model, an increase in valuation difference hetero-
geneity cannot be captured directly as an increase in horizontal product differentiation, no matter
whether this is interpreted as an increase in t or as an outward shift in product locations L. Instead,
it corresponds to a simultaneous increase in t and in the highest consumer valuation vmax such that
the average consumer valuation V = vmax − t/2 is not affected. Figure A.3(c) depicts the effects










(a) Effects of increasing t




(b) Effects of increasing L
(for vmax = 1.25, t = 0.5)
t = 0.5, vmax = 1.25
t = 1, vmax = 1.5
(c) Effects of simultaneously in-































Figure A.3: Valuation Difference Heterogeneity vs. Product Differentiation
A.3.2 The relation between WTP-heterogeneity and consumer surplus
We first provide the arguments concerning the relation between W and consumer surplus. The
results all rely on the expression for consumer surplus given in Lemma A.3.
35The upward-sloping parts of the line correspond to consumer locations to the left of −0.25 and to the right of
0.25, respectively.
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First, starting from Lemmas A.1 and A.3, tedious calculations identify two regions where the total
effects on consumer surplus are negative. In region H, ∂CS
∗




0. In Region M, ∂CS
∗
∂W < 0 if and only if
−1 + s(E,W ) +W (1− 6E(−1 +W )2 − 144E2W + 63EWs(E,W )+
W (−3 + 2W )(−1 +W + s(E,W ))) < 0,











Figure A.4: The Relation between WTP Heterogeneity W and Consumer Surplus
These two regions are shaded in Figure A.4. Moreover, the dashed lines depict local minima of net
consumer surplus as a function of W for each E. The solid lines depict local maxima, with the
parts emphasized in bold corresponding to the higher of these two local maxima, which we denote






3 for E ∈ [0, E1]
0 for E ∈ [E1, 1]
1




3 for E ≥ E2
,
where the regime boundaries are given approximately as E1 ≈ 0.8165 and E2 ≈ 2. The emphasized
black discontinuous solid line in Figure A.4 depicts this line.
The figure also illustrates the claim that, for sufficiently high initial values of W , consumer surplus
is increasing in W : The line W̃CS(E) corresponds to the values of W for which consumer surplus




4+6E for E ∈ [0, E1]
−1 + 3.5E + 0.57735
√




8 + 2E + 5E2 + 2
√
16 + 8E + 12E2 − 4E3 + E4
)
for E ∈ [1, E2]
12+12E+7E2
4+6E for E ≥ E2
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Finally, by combining Figures 3 and A.4, we arrive at Figure A.5, which separates the regions where
there are conflicts of interest between consumers and the firm. In the shaded regions, the signs of
the effect of W on profits and consumer surplus differ. In the other regions the sign of the effect of







2 4 6 8
positive effect on profits
and consumer surplus









Note: Solid arrows correspond to firm profits, dashed arrows to consumer surplus. An
upward-pointing arrow corresponds to positive effects of marginal WTP-increases on
the respective quantity, a downward-pointing arrow to a negative effect.
Figure A.5: Conflicts of Interest
A.3.3 One-dimensional Heterogeneity
We now derive the formulas on which Figure 5 in the example of Section 4.4 is based on.
Demand for symmetric prices (p, p) is given as D(p, p;A) = Prob
(






and profits are Π(p, p;A) = pD(p, p;A). Straightforward calculations then show that























Finally, total surplus is given as








(1 +A)2(5A− 1)− 3(A− 1)p2 − 2p3
12A2
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We show that there can be no profitable upward deviation from the candidate equilibrium p∗ = 2E.
To this end, we calculate an upper bound to the deviation profit that ignores the fact that the
deviating firm my lose some consumers to the outside option. We can calculate the demand of
a firm i after an upward deviation to a price p under the assumption that it will maintain all
consumers for whom vi − pi ≥ vj − pj no matter whether vi − pi ≥ 0 or not as (4E−pi)4E . Using this
upper bound for the demand after deviation, we obtain an upper bound for the deviation profit as
(4E−p)p
4E . This expression is maximized for p = 2E, in which case it becomes E. As this is the profit
in the proposed equilibrium, there cannot be a profitable deviation.
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